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Much of the philosophical debate surrounding the concept of information in 
biology centers on the question of whether or not biological systems ‘really’ carry 
information. The criterion for determining if a system “really” carries information is 
whether or not there is a principled, theoretical account of information that captures the 
relevant biological usages.  Sahotra Sarkar says, 
There is no clear, technical notion of "information" in molecular biology. It is little more 
than a metaphor that masquerades as a theoretical concept and leads to a misleading 
picture of possible explanations in molecular biology. (Sarkar 1996, p. 187) 
 
Here, since biological systems do not ‘really’ carry information, information talk is 
merely heuristic and philosophically uninteresting.  Details of other biological practices 
that utilize informational concepts are often lost because the debate is too focused on one 
instance of information talk—genetic information and because biological representations 
are thought to need a certain kind of philosophical foundation. The problem with this 
methodology is that it takes the failure of philosophical accounts of information to 
capture current biological practices as conclusive evidence that informational 
representations in biology are incoherent. This approach is backwards. 
My task is to put practice first and give an account of what biologists mean when 
they use informational concepts. I argue that many philosophers have put the question of 
justification before interpretation—putting the cart before horse. We need to know what 
biologists are doing when they use this term before we try to justify their usage.  The 
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standard philosophical approach has been to develop a precise justified account of 
information and apply it to the biology and conclude that the biologist is conceptually 
confused when the account does not match the practice.  I think that this is the wrong 
approach. 
In this paper, I shift attention from abstract reasoning about information in the 
philosophical literature to concrete reasoning about informational models in biology. The 
current debate pays too little attention to the biologically prominent concept of signal. I 
argue that biologists use the concept of signal to model distinct functional roles in 
biological systems and not in any of the theoretical senses of information found in the 
current philosophical literature. For cell biologists, a signal causally indicates the state of 
a system at a given point and is used in the context of a style of functional explanation 
generally known as ‘causal role function,’ in which a mechanism or entity has a function 
if its behavior explains a contribution to a capacity of interest. 
I support this analysis with an example drawn from cell biology and reframe the 
debate over the significance of informational terms in biology. The focus on signal 
recasts the debate by highlighting examples of information talk which are central to 
active research programs in biology. The advantage of looking at these models is that 
their centrality to biological practice forces us to reconsider the adequacy of a 
methodology that dismisses biological models because we lack a particular kind of 
philosophical understanding of them. Standard philosophical accounts of information rely 
on assumptions appropriate for the needs of philosophers but are ill-suited for capturing 
biological practice. A contextualized understanding of the role of signal in biological 
practice allows us to work out from the details of practice to tackle broader philosophical 
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issues. On this view, the significance of information talk in biology hinges more on our 
understanding of how biologists represent function than on our understanding of 
philosophical accounts of information. 
 
 
2. Traditional Philosophical Approaches 
 
Philosophical arguments about biological information are too constrained by 
traditional philosophical assumptions to provide a satisfactory account of biological 
information.  They tell us as much about how philosophy of science is typically done than 
about the biological practice.  In particular, these arguments assume: 1) that information 
talk is to be understood in terms of a technical or formal account of information; and 2) 
that the meaning of the term ‘information’ alone explains how informational models are 
applied in the world and 3) that a single account of information must capture all 
biological concepts.  As a result, the suggested analyses of information are unnecessarily 
narrow.  The way to move the debate forward is to abandon these core constraints, which 
allows for a fresh look at biological information—one that is necessary for understanding 
the role that informational concepts play in the production of biological knowledge. 
The philosophical analyses reviewed here exhibit a particular style of 
philosophical reasoning.  The standard approach is to frame the debate around the 
question of whether the concept of information can justify a distinction between the role 
of genes and environments in development.  The task of the philosopher is then to assess 
this question by doing three things.  First, clearly articulate different formal (or at least 
precise) accounts of information.  Second, apply this account to the relevant phenomena.  
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Third, determine if the account supports the distinction between genes and environment.  
If the account articulated captures the distinction, we have clarified the concept at hand.  
If not, then we have shown that that concept does not support the distinction.  If we have 
articulated all of the relevant concepts and none of them justify the distinction, we can 
conclude that no concept can justify the distinction.  This style of reasoning is severely 
constrained.   
A shortcoming of this style of reasoning is that it has yet to provide a successful 
explication of what biologists mean when they use the term information.  To date 
biological information has been analyzed as the reduction of uncertainty [see Sarkar 
(1996a), Sarkar (1996b), Griffiths and Gray (1994), Griffiths and Knight (1997), Griffiths 
(2001)], systematic causal connection [see Griffiths and Gray (1994), Griffiths and 
Knight (1997), Griffiths (2001)], cybernetic feedback [see Sarkar (1996a), Sarkar 
(1996b)], algorithmic complexity (Winnie 2000), evolved meaningfulness (Maynard 
Smith 2000a), evolved meaningful response (Jablonka 2002) and semioticity (Sarkar 
2005). 
Jablonka’s (2002) work does the best in my opinion but is still limited by her 
development of an exclusively semantic approach.  The failure of these accounts to 
capture what biologists mean is due to the fact that philosophical constraints hamper the 
ability of philosophers to explicate information talk.  Specifically, the philosophical 
assumptions that an account of information be formal, decontextualized and monistic 
undermine our ability to figure out what biologists mean by information talk.  The reason 
for these assumptions is that these are the philosophical requirements to justify the 
relevant distinction between genes and environments.  They are philosophical conditions 
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for the satisfactory determination of whether a given account philosophically justifies or 
undermines the informational distinction between the developmental roles of genes and 
environments.  They have little to do with how and why biologists use information talk in 
their work.  I argue that the way to move the debate forward is by abandoning these 
assumptions and looking to the details of scientific practice.  Several of these 
assumptions come from the way the debate is framed around the question of whether only 
genes carry information.  If we temporarily set this question aside and instead simply try 
to figure out what biologists mean by the information talk that they use, we will advance 
our understanding of information talk in biology.   
The first assumption underlies what it is to be a satisfactory philosophical 
account; a philosophical account must be precise, preferably formal, and often reductive.  
Much of the debate explicates information talk in terms of the mathematically defined 
Shannon information or in a precisely articulated concept of semantic information.  Both 
accounts reduce the imprecise information talk of biologists into the clearly set out 
concepts of reduction of uncertainty or evolved form.  The reason that philosophers have 
focused on developing precise reductive accounts is that they are necessary for 
determining if only genes can carry information.  If the account is imprecise, there is no 
way to determine whether or not it only applies to genes.  It is not that there is anything 
wrong with precision or reductive accounts in general.  The problem is that we should not 
assume that we need a precise, reductive account of information to understand what 
biologists mean when they use it.  Precise, formal accounts are preferable, but they are 
not, as some philosophers would have you believe, the only accounts worth having. 
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The second assumption is the idea that the meaning of the concept of information 
must by itself pick out the relevant phenomena.   Much of the debate consists in setting 
out different possible meanings of the concept of information and applying these 
information concepts to biological test cases.  The assumption is that there is a simple, 
direct correspondence between the meaning of the concept of information and what it 
picks out in biological practice.  This assumption is problematic because it blinds us to 
context dependent features of information talk due to differing styles of explanation.  
Differences in applications of information talk might be due to different contextual 
features of particular biological investigations.  It is possible that biologists think that 
only genes carry information because of differences in the way the concept is used in 
different research traditions.  Our explication of information talk should not assume that 
the key to understanding information talk is to set out a special meaning for the concept 
of information.  It is certainly possible that biologists mean something ordinary by 
information and that differences in application can be explained by differences in relevant 
contextual features. 
The final assumption is the denial of plurality.  All of the relevant philosophical 
candidates seek to capture the meaning of biological information under a single account.  
The insistence that all usages of biological information should be made comprehensible 
by a single account blinds us to the diversity of informational applications in biology.  It 
is entirely possible (and perhaps even likely) that biologists use informational concepts in 
different ways, with different meanings in different contexts.  Insisting that a single 
account be capable of subsuming all of biological information is more likely to obscure 
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than clarify what biologists mean.  Embracing a pluralistic stance towards biological 
practice is a better approach (Kellert, Longino & Waters 2006). 
The current debate represents the outcome of a particular style of philosophical 
reasoning that seeks to articulate a single, precise role for a concept whose meaning alone 
determines how it is applied.  This program has challenged the philosophical justification 
of the claim that only genes carry information, shifting the burden of proof on to the 
philosophical defenders of this claim.  The problem is that philosophers also seek to 
dismiss the role of information talk in biology.  Often authors will end their argument that 
information does not play a particular role with the claim that as a result information talk 
is useless or misleading.  This extension is a misstep.  What they really mean is that, if 
you accept standard philosophical assumptions about what is scientifically relevant, then 
there is no role for information in biology; that is, all the arguments show is that to date 
we have not been able to articulate an account of information that meets our 
philosophical standards.  Of course the key issue here is how appropriate are the 
philosophical assumptions which ground that judgment.  I have argued that these 
assumptions should be abandoned if we are to understand the role information talk plays 
in biology.  I propose an alternate strategy that puts capturing the meaning of the 
biologists first and worries about the justification of particular assertions like ‘only genes 
carry information’ second.  The advantage of this approach is that our explication is not 
constrained by common philosophical assumptions.  Additionally, if we can develop an 
accurate account of information talk, we are in a position to assess which philosophical 
assumptions are necessary to argue for particular claims.  Working out from biological 
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practice will illuminate our philosophical assumptions, instead of having our 




The primary focus of much of the philosophical debate on biological information 
is on the meaning of information itself.  However, the significance of information in 
biology extends beyond the meaning of the concept of information alone and includes a 
wide range of related concepts like signal, code and network.  These concepts are 
ubiquitous in biology and in the case of signal more prominent that that of information 
itself.  Frequently, information is only mentioned in the introduction or conclusion of an 
article, while signaling dominates the bulk of the body of a great deal of papers.  
Elucidating the role that information talk plays in biological explanations requires an 
analysis of the whole family of related terms.  For example, when biologists say 
something is encoded in DNA they describe an informational function without actually 
using the word ‘information.’  With the exception of Godfrey-Smith’s work on the 
concept of code, (Godfrey-Smith 2000a, 2002) too little philosophical attention is 
focused on the relationship between terms like signal and network. Our aim should be to 
explore informational explanations including ones that do not use the term information. 
The term signal is especially important because of its striking prominence in current 
biological explanations. 
Despite the extensive literature on information in biology, the concept of signal 
receives little philosophical attention.  This is somewhat surprising because it is central to 
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biological explanations in a way that the concept of information is not.  New journals are 
exclusively dedicated to understanding signaling processes and their role in the 
functioning of complex biological systems.  It is difficult to find descriptions of function 
and development that do not involve signaling processes in some way.  Is talk of 
signaling merely colorful language unsupported by a coherent account as some 
philosophers argue is the case with information talk?  Most, importantly what do 
biologists mean by signal?   
 
4. Jablonka on Signal 
 
One way to investigate what biologists mean by signal is to identify the biological 
processes they label as signaling.  What phenomena are biologists picking out in the 
world and referring when they discuss signaling?  Signaling processes involve molecules 
binding with cell surfaces leading to intracellular chemical cascades, which result in 
specific cellular activities like changes in cell metabolism or in the transcription of DNA.  
Although, there are clear exceptions to this generalized picture; three important features 
emerge.  First, signaling processes involve molecules binding to cell surfaces.  Second, 
signaling processes involve self-resetting, intracellular cascades as secondary 
messengers.  Finally, signaling processes end with metabolic, structural or transcriptional 
changes in the cell.   
Do these loose criteria define signaling processes by picking out all cases of 
signaling processes and only cases of signaling processes?  Unfortunately, these features 
are neither necessary nor sufficient as criteria for signaling processes in biology.  There 
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are both exceptions to the general case and instances of processes which meet these 
features but are not signaling processes.  As a result, we need to look beyond mere 
descriptive accounts of signal to get at what biologists mean. 
Eva Jablonka offers an analysis of ‘signal’ as part of her account of biological 
information.  Signals are special cases of biological information in which both the source 
and receiver are products of evolution.  She says, “The term ‘signal’ will be reserved only 
for evolved informational inputs, that is, evolved inputs produced by an evolved or 
otherwise designed source” (Jablonka 2002, p. 582).  The key idea in Jablonka’s account 
of biological information is that there is information when there is an adaptive functional 
response to the form of a source.  She reserves signal for cases in which there is an 
adaptive functional response to the form of a source and the source is the product of 
evolution as well.  Since signal is a special case of biological information for Jablonka, it 
is necessary to set out her account of biological information to fully understand her 
account of signal.  She describes information in the following way, 
…a source--an entity or a process--can be said to have information when a receiver 
system reacts to this source in a special way.  The reaction of the receiver to a source has 
to be such that the reaction of the receiver can actually or potentially change the state of 
the receiver in a (usually) functional manner.  Moreover, there must be a consistent 
relation between variations in the form of the source and the corresponding changes in 
the receiver.” (Jablonka 2002, p. 582) 
 
There are four key elements in her account of biological information.   First, Jablonka 
conceptualizes information in terms of a source and a receiver.  Variations in a source are 
read by a receiver.  The source is an ‘entity or process’ which provides input.  The 
receiver ‘reads’ the input and responds accordingly.  Second, the receiver responds to the 
form of the source, in that it responds to the organization of the source, not its physical or 
chemical properties.   Third, the receiver acts in a functional manner to the organization 
of the source.  By functional, Jablonka stipulates that in cases of information the response 
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is functional in both the ‘selected effects’(Wright 1973) and the ‘causal role’ (Cummins 
1975) senses of function; that is, the presence of the response is explained by the fact that 
it is evolutionarily advantageous (Selected Effects sense) and the response contributes to 
the behavior of a containing system (Causal Role sense).  Finally, there is a systematic 
relationship between variations in the source and variations in the response of the 
receiver.  Variations in the organization of the source must reliably lead to variations in 
the adaptive functional responses of the receiver.   
Jablonka argues that her functional criterion applies to two distinct concepts of 
‘function,’ an evolutionary sense of function and a causal sense of function.  The 
evolutionary sense is important because it provides the semantic foundation for the 
meaningfulness in her account of information.  For Jablonka, signals are meaningful 
because they play a functional role in an evolutionary sense.  In the evolutionary sense of 
function, the function of something explains its presence.  For example, if you say that 
the function of the heart is to pump blood, according to a Selected Effects functional 
explanation the presence of heart is explained by its ability to pump blood.  That is, you 
have a heart because your ancestors had such an organ that pumped blood.  If you say 
that the function of a cellular signal is to play a particular role, you are explaining that the 
signal is there because it plays that role.   A Wright functional explanation explains why 
the signal is present. 
 An alternative account of functional explanation is the causal account of function 
in which to explain the function of something is to describe its contribution to the 
maintenance of a capacity in a containing system.  In this sense of functional explanation, 
the function of the heart is to play a particular kind of role in maintaining a capacity of 
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the circulatory system.  What is explained here is not the presence of the heart, but its 
contribution to a larger system.   
 For Jablonka, a something counts as a signal because it acquires meaningfulness 
because it form was shaped by evolution and this form is read in a functional manner 
where function is understood to include both evolutionary and causal senses of function.  
This analysis does not match the standard cell biology usage.  First, cell biologists apply 
the concept of ‘signal’ to abiotic inputs that are not shaped by evolution.  For example, 
heat shock proteins and other stress proteins involve environmental cues triggering 
cellular signaling processes, but molecular and cell biologists make no distinction 
between these signaling processes and those that involve evolved sources, but they 
should if Jablonka’s account is right.   
A second problem is that under Jablonka’s account the source must respond to 
form of the input.  Recall that by form Jablonka means that the receiver responds to the 
source’s organization as distinct from its chemical and physical properties.  The problem 
is that signaling molecules interact with various receptors by way of standard 
biochemical interactions.   There is not a step in the signaling process in which the 
‘reading mechanisms’ of the target cell are obviously responding to the form of the 
source.  This is a problem for Jablonka’s account because reacting to the form of a source 
is necessary for an interaction to be informational on the teleosemantic model.  The 
receiver is supposed to react to the form as distinct from the chemical properties of the 
source.  Of course, if every chemical interaction involves a reaction to form, Jablonka 
invalidates her original distinction between organization and physical/chemical 
properties.   
 13
 Jablonka claims that something must have both kinds of functional roles to count 
as information.  Her fusion of distinct modes of functional explanation obscures 
important differences and is mistaken.  The problem is that biologists do not necessarily 
attribute a function in the evolutionary sense to signals.  For example, Bishop, Buzko and 
Shokat (2001) outline experimental procedures for creating and manipulating signaling 
pathways.  Radically new pathways are engineered to exhibit desired characteristics.  
These novel pathways clearly lack an evolutionary history and cannot have a function in 
the selected effect sense.  The problem for Jablonka is that biologists still conceptualize 
them as signal pathways, which shows that a selected effects function is not necessary for 
a process to be considered a signal by cell biologists. 
 Ultimately, Jablonka’s account of signal fails to capture the sense of signal typical 
of research in cellular biology.  In the cell biology usage, signal does not set apart a 
special class of evolved inputs, nor involve a reaction to the form of an input nor 
necessarily play a role in Wright functional explanations.  For Jablonka something is a 
signal if it is an evolved input read in a particular way.  For cell biologists, something is a 
signal if a causal process plays a particular kind of functional role in a wider biological 
context. 
 
5. Signal in Cell Biology 
 
Once we relax the standard philosophical assumptions about what is required to 
philosophically account for biological practice, we can develop a relatively intuitive, 
straightforward understanding of how some biologists use signal.  Signaling processes in 
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cellular biology are best understood in terms of nested causal role functions.  To be a 
signal is to have a distinctive kind of biological function.  Many biological systems have 
mechanisms that allow for them to respond appropriately at one location in light of 
changes to the state of another part of the system.  These are signaling mechanisms 
because of the functional role they play.  Particular signaling mechanisms are also 
explained in terms of causal role function in which the capacity to signal is understood in 
terms of mechanisms that use the presence or absence of signaling molecules as proxies 
for states of a system at another location. 
We can see why the schema outlined above is not enough to provide an account 
of signal.  It lacks the broader functional context that makes a signal a signal.  Consider a 
biological capacity like quorum sensing in bacteria.  Some bacteria have the capacity to 
act in a coordinated fashion.  They regulate their behavior depending on colony density.  
For example, the bacteria V. fischeri live in a symbiotic relationship with the Hawaiian 
Bobtailed squid—producing bioluminescent compounds when densely packed in the 
squid’s light organ.  Quorum sensing bacteria produce signal molecules known as 
autoinducers and also have an autoinducer binding site.  In normal environments, it is 
rare for a bacterium’s own autoinducer to bind with its own binding site.  In colonies, the 
concentration of autoinducers increases in an environment.  Some of the available 
autoinducer binds with the bacteria’s autoinducer receptors triggering still more 
production.    When the threshold is reached and the receptor is fully activated, the 
receptor triggers a change in DNA transcription producing the bioluminescent compound.  
Many things play a causal role function contributing to this capacity.  Quorum sensing 
counts as a signaling process because it allows for communities of bacteria to act 
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appropriately given the state of the system at a different location.  The capacity of 
quorum sensing is explained in terms of a mechanism that uses the presence or absence 




 A quick look at the concept of biological information from the perspective of 
practice reveals that signal is the most noteworthy informational concept in biology.  If 
we look at signal unencumbered by standard philosophical assumptions, we can make 
sense of the work signal does in specific biological explanations.  It describes a particular 
kind of biological function, one in which a system uses one thing to act as a proxy for 
another.  I argue that we can learn more about biological practices if we do not insist that 
our philosophical accounts must be precise, decontextualized and monistic.  We can 
consider the justification of biological concepts once we have a clear picture of the work 
done by them.  If the above analysis of signal is correct, questions about the philosophical 
significance of biological information are really questions about the philosophical 
significance of functional explanation in biology and need to examined in that light. 
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